Survival May Not be for the Fittest (Lessons from some TV games) by Ahmed, E. & Hegazi, A. S.
 Survival May Not be for the Fittest (Lessons from some TV games) 
 
  E.Ahmed and A.S.Hegazi  
Mathematics Department, Faculty of Sciences, Mansoura 35516, EGYPT. 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper we argue that biological fitness is a multi-objective concept hence 
the statement "fittest" is inappropriate. The following statement is proposed "Survival 
is mostly for those with non-dominated fitness". Also we use some TV games to show 
that under the following conditions:  
i) There are no dominant players. 
ii) At each time step successful players may eliminate some of their less 
successful competitors, 
Then the ultimate winner may not be the fittest (but close). 
 
1. Multi-objective fitness: 
Definition (1): A measure of biological fitness of an animal is the number of its 
offspring that reaches maturity. 
An equivalent definition is that it is the number of its offspring that are in the best 
possible state (to ensure that they will have their offspring). 
It is clear that this definition is a multi-objective one since it can be decomposed into 
the following two objectives: 
i) Maximize the number of offspring. 
ii) Maximize their state (e.g. food, protection, training to hunt etc…). 
These objectives are contradictory hence biological fitness is a multi-objective 
concept. Now we recall some basics of multi-objective optimization [Ehrgott 2005]. 
Almost every real life problem is multi-objective (MOB). Methods for  MOB 
optimization are mostly intuitive.  
Definition (2): A MOB problem is: 
Minimize (min) subject   k1,2,...,i ),( =xZi to           0)x(h,0)x(g =≤         (1) 
Definition (3): A vector *x  dominates x ' if kixZxZ ii ,...,2,1)'()( =∀≤  with strict 
inequality for at least one i, given that all constraints are satisfied for both vectors. 
 
 A non-dominated solution *x  is called Pareto optimal and the corresponding 
vector k1,2,...,i *),( =xZi is called efficient. The set of such solutions is called a 
Pareto set. 
 Now we discuss some methods for solving MOB problems: 
The first method is the lexicographic method. In this method objectives are ordered 
according to their importance. Then a single objective problem is solved while 
completing the problem gradually with constraints i.e.  
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then if ZMIN(1) is the solution the second step is  
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and so on. 
A famous application is in university admittance where students with highest grades 
are allowed in any college they choose. The second best group is allowed only the 
remaining places and so on. This method is useful but in some cases it is not 
applicable. 
Proposition (1): An optimal solution for the lexicographic problem is Pareto optimal. 
Proof: Let *x   be the solution to the Lexicographic problem . Thus lP
)(*)( Zand  1,...,2,1*),()( then Z* i xZxlixZxxx lli <−==≠ . Thus *x  is not 
dominated. Q.E.D. 
The second method is the method of weights. Assume that it is required to 
minimize the objectives Z(j), j=1,2,..,n. (The problem of maximization is obtained via 
replacing Z(j) by -Z(j)). Define 
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 Then the problem becomes to minimize Z subject to the constraints. This 
method is easy to implement but it has several weaknesses. The first is that it is not 
applicable if the feasible set is not convex. The second difficulty of this method is that 
it is difficult to apply for large number of objectives. However it is quite effective for 
multi-objective problems with discrete parameters since in this case Pareto optimal set 
is discrete not a continuous curve. 
The third method is the compromise method (sometimes called ε - constraint 
method . In this case one minimizes only one objective while setting the other 
objectives as constraints e.g. minimize Z(k) subject to Z(j)
)(kPε
≤a(j) j=2,3,…k-1,k+1,…,n, 
where  a(j) are parameters to be gradually decreased till no solution is found. The 
problem with this method is the choice of the thresholds a(j). If the solution is unique, 
then this method is guaranteed to give a Pareto optimal solution. 
Proposition (2): If the solution is unique, then the ε - constraint method is guaranteed 
to give a Pareto optimal solution. 
Proof: Let *x  be the optimal solution for the ε - constraint method then 
)(*)(* xZxZthenxx kk <≠∀  hence *x  is Pareto optimal. If *x  is not unique then it is 
weakly Pareto i.e. there is no *xx ≠  such that nixZxZ ii ,...,2,1)(*)( =∀<   Q.E.D 
A fourth method using fuzzy logic is to study each objective individually and find its 
maximum and minimum say ZMAX(j), ZMIN(j) respectively. Then determine a 
membership m(j)=(ZMAX(j)-Z(j))/(ZMAX(j)-ZMIN(j)). Thus 0≤m(j) 1. Then 
apply Max{MIN{m(j), j=1,2,…,n}}. Again this method is guaranteed to give a Pareto 
optimal solution provided that the solution is unique otherwise it is weakly Pareto.  
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 It is clear that in multi-objective problems there is no "best" solution, only 
non-dominated ones. Hence the term fittest is in-appropriate. We propose to replace it 
by "non-dominated fitness". This may explain the survival of unfit animals e.g. the 
Panda (which eats only one type of food and mates only one day per year). Also this 
answers the question: Which is the fittest? The strong (e.g. lion), the fast (e.g. the 
cheetah) or the adaptable (e.g. the rat)? 
 
2. Games where successful players may eliminate some of their less successful 
competitors: 
 In some TV games, at each time step t=1,2,3,…, the players compete. Then 
the more successful players choose one of the worst two (or three) players and 
eliminate him (her) . It has been observed that in several cases when one of the overall 
strong players fall into the worst two (or three) players the other competitors chose to 
eliminate him (her). The logic is that they have a better chance of winning the game if 
their final opponent is an overall weak. This contradicts the statement "survival for 
the fittest". In the following we will analyze this game using prisoner's dilemma (PD) 
game [Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, Webb 2007]. 
     Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among 
rational players produce outcomes (profits) with respect to the preferences of the 
players. It consists of three sets: The set of players, set of strategies and the set of 
payoffs. Each player in a game faces a choice among two or more possible strategies. 
A strategy is a predetermined program of play that tells the player what actions to take 
in response to every possible strategy other players may use.  
A basic property of game theory is that one’s payoff depends on the others’ decisions 
as well as his. 
    The mathematical framework of the non-cooperative game theory was initiated by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 . Also they had suggested the max-min 
solution for games which is calculated as follows: Consider two players A and B are 
playing against each other. Two strategies (S1,S2) (S'1, S'2) are allowed for both of 
them. This game is called two-player, two-strategy game. Let the payoff matrix be 
. For zero sum games the max-min solution of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
is for the first player to choose max{min(a,b), min(c,d)}. The second player chooses 
min{max(a,c), max(b,d)}. If both quantities are equal then the game is stable. 
Otherwise use mixed strategies.  
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A weakness of this formalism has been pointed out by Maynard Smith in the hawk-
dove (HD) game whose payoff matrix is .The max-min implies 
(for v<c) that the solution is D yet as he pointed out this solution is unstable since if 
one of the players adopts H in a population of D he will a very large payoff which will 
make other players switch to H and so on till number of H is large enough that they 
play each other frequently and get the low payoff (v-c)/2. Thus the stable solution is 
that the fraction of hawks should be nonzero. To quantify this concept one may use 
the replicator equation which intuitively means that the rate of change of the fraction 
of players adopting strategy i is proportional to the difference between their payoff 
and the average payoff of the population i.e. 
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where  is the fraction of players adopting strategy i, and ix Π  is the payoff matrix. 
Applying (4) to the HD game one gets that the asymptotically stable equilibrium 
solution is x=v/c where x is the fraction of hawks in the population. 
For asymmetric game the replicator dynamics equation is 
n1,2,...,i , ]2)2[(/    ],1)1[(/ =Π−Π=Π−Π= xyxydtdyyxyxdtdx iiiiii   (5) 
A basic drawback of normal game theory is the assumption that all players interact 
globally. It is more realistic to study local games e.g. games on a lattice where players 
interact only with their nearest neighbors. Also there are several modifications for 
game formulations. 
 The prisoner's dilemma game (PD) is a symmetric game where each player 
has two possible strategies cooperate C or defect D with payoff matrix 
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, T>R>U>S, 2R>T+S                        (6) 
The stable solution of this game is for both players to defect. 
 In the games under consideration, players belong to one of two sets the 
stronger (more successful in the competition at time t) players and the weaker (at time 
t) ones from which a player will be chosen to be eliminated. It is important to realize 
that both sets change with time hence a player in the first set at time t may be in the 
second set at a later time t1>t.  Using PD to study this game one gets three cases: If 
the two players are safe from elimination then cooperation is highly likely since this is 
and iterated PD game [Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998]. If both players are unsafe then 
defect is the dominant strategy.  If one player is safe and the other is not and since 
only the safe player can decide, then choosing the strongest player in the second set is 
the dominant strategy.  This agrees with several observations in several TV programs 
which can be considered as experiments for this game. Hence we reach the following 
conclusion: 
 "In the abovementioned game if each player has a positive probability that he 
(she) will be in the set of weaker players (from which a player will be eliminated) at 
some time t>0 then it is likely that the overall winner of the game may not be the best 
player". 
 
3. Conclusions: 
 In this paper we argue that in real life (or close to it) the statement "survival is 
for the fittest" is inappropriate. Our argument depends on the following points: First, 
almost every real problem is stochastic [Erdi 2008]. Hence the deductive statement "If 
A then B" should be replaced by "If A then B is highly likely to occur". Second 
biological fitness is a multi-objective concept hence the word "fittest" should be 
replaced by "non-dominated fitness". Consequently it is proposed to replace "survival 
is for the fittest" by "survival is for those with non-dominated fitness". 
The results of abovementioned TV games support our conclusion. 
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